As they say, the more we fail, the more we succeed

The crash of the Boeing 737 Max 8 plane soon after takeoff in Ethiopia on March 10 led me to wonder yet again about the omnipresent determination of engineers to invent new devices to replace existing systems, even ones that worked quite well.

Information from the Ethiopian Airlines plane’s black box indicates that, most likely, the crash came about because of the same malfunction that caused the crash of another Boeing 737 Max 8 five months earlier off the coast of Indonesia: A defect involving a new software system that kicked in when it shouldn’t have, and that instead of correcting something that had gone wrong, introduced a calamitous series of events that, in part because of insufficient instruction for the pilots of the planes, proves to be fatally incorrect within moments.

The development of the new software system became necessary because Boeing had redesigned its 737 planes with bigger, more fuel-efficient engines whose weight and placement changed the positions of each plane’s center of gravity from what it had been in the older, so-called Next Generation 737s. Fuel efficiency is certainly a worthy goal — a crucial goal in light of global warming — but it seems obvious to me that the change and the introduction of a different software system scream out for exhaustive tests of the equipment under carefully controlled circumstances.

That includes ones in which automatic sensors and other devices are set to function improperly, so that engineers can determine how to deal with such malfunctions.

They also scream out for the intensive training of pilots in all aspects of the new computer program, and how to override possible automatic malfunctions.

But Boeing convinced the Federal Aviation Administration that such training was not necessary. In addition, since the early 2000s, Boeing — rather than the FAA — certifies the safety of its planes. That is, Boeing employees rather than FAA experts bear responsibility for testing Boeing planes and making sure they are safe.

That in and of itself seems to be to be a recipe for disaster.

Recent history provides examples of updated designs and devices that proved to have fatal flaws: The badly designed Ford Pinto, which led to the deaths of hundreds of people in what should have been survivable rear-end collisions. Takata airbags, whose glitches led them to explode with lethal force. The Samsung cell phones that burst into flames. Pacemakers and defibrillators that investigators showed could be vulnerable to electronic hackers.

In the case of the DC-10 that crashed right after takeoff from O’Hare Airport in Chicago in 1979, the culprit was not the plane’s design, but the improper re-attachment of an engine that had been removed for maintenance.

There are also many examples of new devices that, while undoubtedly proving to be immensely useful, also had unanticipated negative consequences. Everything that came into existence during the Industrial Revolution could serve as examples, such as the horrendous pollution emanating from coal-burning machines.

Would the inventors of automobiles have envisioned that in 1972 more than 54,500 people would be killed in car accidents in the United States? When the internet debuted, would anyone have predicted its role in the horrific massacre of at least 50 people in two Christchurch, New Zealand mosques?

Surgeons increasingly rely on robotic devices in operating rooms, but their use, too, can have negative consequences. Recently, The New York Times posted online an article about surgeons using robotic arms in ways not only not yet approved by government regulators, but in ways that have proved extremely painful, and in some cases even fatal — in particular, surgery involving some victims of cervical cancer.

Many chemicals whose creation furthered significant developments in manufacturing or enjoyed enthusiastic receptions for other reasons have also turned out to be deadly — formaldehyde, for example. Or more recently, a substance contained in sunscreens that is killing coral reefs.

In “To Engineer is Human,” a book I found recently by chance in my building’s laundry room library, author and civil engineer Henry Petroski writes that the impulse to create something new and better seems to be built into human DNA. But by now we should all be acutely aware that we cannot assume that everything new under the sun will work as its inventors or creators intended.

We also should be acutely aware that no human can possible envision every possible negative consequence of the introduction of new devices and systems. So it obviously follows that malfunctions — some of them catastrophic — cannot be completely avoided.

And as Petroski makes clear, such accidents lead to new information and new knowledge that truly helps engineers improve their designs. That insight is reflected in the secondary title of Petroski’s book: “The role of failure in successful design.”